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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
Road Commission,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
BETTILYON'S
OSWALD,

INC., and

NOLAN

Case No.
10277

Defendants and Appellants,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Statement of Appellants, as set out in their Brief,
is adequate. We would but add that the action in condemnation was commenced and service of process made on
the 22nd day of July, 1963.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
The case, with respect to the fair value of the land
condemned as well as damages to remaining property not
taken, was tried before a jury of eight in June, 1964. A
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verdict was returned and judgment entered for the Appellants and against the Respondent for $130,000.00 (R. 18,
19 & 20). The judgment has been paid and a receipt given
(R. 61, 62). Certain factors of special damage raised by
Appellants (a part of which underlie this Appeal) were.
at the time of the trial by jury, reserved for subsequent
determination.

Upon later hearing in August, 1964, the

Trial Court, after all interests had rested their cases, denied the claims of special damage of Appellants and granted
the State's Motion for Involuntary Dismissal (R. 63, 64).
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law thereon were
also entered pursuant to Rule 52 (a), Utah Rules of Ci1·it
Procedure (R. 72-78).
The Motion of Appellants for a new trial on damages
was denied by the lower Court (R. 77) and a final Order
of Condemnation was thereupon entered vesting in the Re·
spondent, State of Utah, the fee interest in the demise<l
premises (R. 65-67).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant's attempt to appeal from the Order denying
a new trial( see Notice of Appeal, R. 79) is in vain, since
that Order, as a matter of law, is not final from which an
appeal may be sustained. Little v. Gorman, 19 Utah 6:J,
114 Pac. 321 (1911); White v. Pease, 15 Utah 161, 49 Pac.
255 ( 1897).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Appellants, while argumentative and
largely without record designation, is substantially accur·

!
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ate. The Court will note and distinguish the facts from the
conclusions and arguments therein set forth.
To crystallize as well as add to the Appellants' Statement, Respondent submits the following set of facts as representative:
(a) Appellants, or their predecessors, purchased 35
acres of land (of which the condemned parcels
constitute 12 acres) of undeveloped land in 1959
(R. 159).
(b) Appellants petitioned the Salt Lake County Planning Commission in 1960 to approve a subdivision
plat of the property (R. 164, Ex. D-29-2). A
hearing for final approval of the plan was scheduled before the Planning Commission in December of 1960 (Ex. D-29-5).
(c) The State Road Commission in the late 1950's and
early 1960's, had under consideration the development of Interstate Highway 415, generically referred to as the Belt Route Freeway (Ex. D-29-1
& 4, R. 223-235). In 1960, the said facility was
in initial planning status and although the "corridor location" had not been firmly established,
it was anticipated that a portion of Appellants'
property would be required for the Freeway (R.
235, 236).
(d) Because of the anticipated need, Road Commission
personnel in December, 1960, requested that the
County Planning Commission attempt to delay
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development on such land "as provided by law",
(Ex. D-29-5, R. 275) and "to use whatever legal
means" available to the County to guard the area
within the proposed Freeway right-of-way (Ex.
D-29-9).
(e) Pursuant to County Ordinance 9-7-3, as reviserl ,
the Planning Commission on January 10, 1961,
withheld final approval of Appellants' subdivision
plat for a period of one calendar year, to enable
the Respondent to buy the needed land (Ex. D·
29-9, R. 275).
(f) The Appellants next petitioned the Planning Com·
mission for final approval of the subdivision plat
in May, 1963 (Ex. D-29-14, R. 275).

(g) Meanwhile, the Road Commission in 1961 and
1962, proceeded with further location studies and
programming of the highway facility, including
engineering and right-of-way design, and other :
technical and administrative measures of the
Project (R. 234-241; Ex. D-29-11, R. 275).
(h) There is accord among Appellants and Respondent that the planning, programming and design
of the public improvement and the purchasing of
right-of-way therefor, was accomplished by the
Road Commission in a reasonable manner and
without unnecessary delay (R. 181, 182, 238-240).
(i)

The Road Commission and Bettilyon's negotiated
for the purchase of the properties ultimately con·

i
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demned in the forepart of 1963, but without reaching an accommodation (Ex. D-29-18, R. 275).
(j)

The Respondent commenced this action to condemn a fraction of the Appellants' property in
July of 1963.

The clearest statement of fact which weighs upon this
Court is that entered by the trial Court in its Findings of
Fact on the matter (R. 72, 73, 73A, 74, and 74A).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO DESIGNATE THE NATURE OF THE ERROR ALLEGEDL Y COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL
COURT IN THE MATTER.
It is apparent from Appellant's Brief that they have
misconceived the essence of the appeal and the function
of this Court therein. A reading of the same would suggest
that the matter is presently under consideration by a court
of original jurisdiction for trial de nova as to both fact and
law. The Brief is void of citation of the claimed error committed by the lower Court and of the ensuing prejudice.
For that matter, the Brief lacks averment that the trial
Judge erred at all. Overlooked is the fundamental principal
that a designation of error occasioned by the trial Court
is necessary to this review. The fact is that the issues which
Appellants raise were submitted by full-fledged trial to the
lower Court. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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were, upon special hearing, entered. Yet no reference tr
either is made in Appellants' Brief.

The appellate jurisdiction of this Court requires tha
it not sit as the original arbiter of the fact and law. Arti
cle 8, Section 9, Utah Constitution. In that the instant sui
is one at law, the review is focused only upon the error.
of law committed by the trial Court. 78-2-2 U. C. A., 1953
Whittaker v. Ferguson, 16 Utah 240, 51 Pac. 980 (1898)
Van Leeuwen v. Huffaker, 78 Utah 521, 5 P. 2d 714 (1931)
Such error ought to be set out by Appellants in their Brief
less it be abandoned. Berg v. Otis Elevator, et al., 64 Utal
518, 231Pac.832 (1924).
POINT II.
RESPONDING TO APPELLANTS' POINT I,
THE FACTS OF THE CASE DO NOT MANIFEST A TAKING, ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE, OF APPELLANTS' LAND IN 1961.

For lack of better specification, we assume that th
nub of Appellants' first Point (that the Road Commissio1
caused a legal "taking" of their property in 1961) is Con
clusion of Law No. 7 entered by the trial Court. It is ther
provided:

"7. That the acts of the Road Commission o
the State of Utah in requesting the Planning Com
mission of Salt Lake County to defer action on th
proposed Random Woods Subdivision plat did nu
constitute a taking of the Defendants' proper!.
without compensation and was not in violation °
the 5th and 14th Arndt. to the Fed. Constitution °
Art. 1, Sec. 7 and 22 of the Utah Constitution."
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The claim is made that the Respondent, by its request
to the Planning Commission in December of 1960 to withhold approval of the proposed subdivision plat, worked a
non-physical expropriation of the subject property as of
the date when the Planning Commission reserved approval.
l1pon that basis, they ask for relief that the Judgment on
the verdict of the jury, entered June 29, 1964, carry interest at six per cent ( 6%) per annum from January 10, 1961,
to the date of its entry. (See Apps.' Brief, Conclusion p.
33).
To begin with, if under these facts the Appellants' land
were taken in the constitutional sense, it is quite clear that
the proximate cause was not the request of the State Road
Commission at all; rather, it was the action taken by the
County Planning Commission pursuant to County Ordinance, 9-7-3. That Ordinance contains the proviso:
" ( 1) When a preliminary plat is submitted
for the division of property a part or all of which
is deemed suitable by the Planning Commission for
schools, parks, playgrounds, or other areas for public use, the Planning Commission shall apprise the
proper agency in writing of the property owner's
intent to subdivide. If any such areas proposed for
public use have not been freely dedicated to the
public by the owner or have not been purchased at
a fair price by the proper agency within one (1)
year from the date of notification, such areas may
be divided into lots and sold in accordance with the
provisions of this Title." (Emphasis ours.)
The province of the Respondent under the Ordinance
is recommendatory only. The power to act, in the first

and last analysis, rested with the Planning Commission.
That Agency, and not the Road Commission, resolved to
delay subdivision approval for one year. Albeit, the que,.
tion of proximate cause need not be decided here for the
acts of which complaint is lodged, whether by the Respondent or the County Planning Commission, did not affect
a "taking" of the Appellants' property in 1961. The outer
limits of time in which subdivision approval could be withheld under the Ordinance was one year from the date it
was invoked. Under the facts extant in the case, therefore,
delay could not have been protracted beyond January 10,
1962. If Appellants had petitioned at the latter time for
approval of their plat, the Planning Commission would
have been without aid to withhold ratification. But Appellants did not return to that Agency as was their right.
Not until May of 1963, some sixteen months subsequent,
did they again petition the Planning Commission for approval of the subdivision plan.
But there are several other things Appellants did not
do during 1961, 1962 and the first five months of 1963,
which are also obstacles in their path. They could have
appealed the Planning Commission decision of January
1961, to the County Commission and ultimately to the District Court. 57-5-3 U. C. A., 1953 as amended; 78-3-4 U.
C. A., 1953. They did neither. A mandamus action could
have been filed against the Planning Commission to W
prove or reject the subdivision plan. Rule 65B (a), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Such was not done. Appellants
could have, in a direct action against Salt Lake County,
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attacked the validity and constitutionality of the Ordinance
9-7-3, on the ground that the one year restraint constituted
a "taking" of land without compensation in contravention
of State and Federal Constitutions. That remedy would
have given to Appellants a decision as to which they now
urge entitlement.
Rather than pursue any of the foregoing, Appellants
choose presently to rest their cause on an attack upon the
Ordinance in this proceeding.* Such an attack is collateral
to the issues and the parties before the Court and is not
permitted where opportunity otherwise existed to raise the
question directly. The Massachusetts Supreme Court in
the eminent domain suit of Robinson v. Commonwealth,
335 Mass. 630, 141 N. E. 2d 727 ( 1957) states the rule:
"* * * The Petitioner contended that these
zoning ordinances were invalid and offered to show
through one Warner * * * that as applied to
the parcels in question the Ordinances were invalid
* * * The only issue in this case is the ruling
excluding such evidence of value.
"There was no error.
"The Petitioner had ample opportunity to attack directly the Ordinances if he had desired to do
so. He could have filed a petition in the Land Court.
* * *, or he could have filed a suit for declaratory relief in the Superior Court * * *, to determine the validity of the Ordinances, * * *
(citing authorities); but in our opinion he could not
*The bulk of Appellants' Brief (pp. 22-27) is devoted to
decisions wherein statutes and ordinances were found unconstitutional for one or more reasons.
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at the trial of the petition for land damages against
the Commonwealth attack the zoning ordinanc
(citing authorities)."
es.
Also, see Bowling Green-Warren County Airport Bd.
v. Long, 364 S. W. 2d 167 (Ky.), Nichols on Eminent Do·
main, Vol. 4, P. 238, §12.322 to the same effect.
(a) Under the facts of the case, a "taking" of

Appellants' property did not occur.
Apart from the County Ordinance, Appellants seem
to argue that the request made by the Respondent of the
Planning Commission to delay plat approval was, ipso
facto, a "taking" of their property. That is hard to do in
the face of a series of cases stemming from this Court, all
demanding of a contrary result. State of Utah v. Peek,
1 U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953); State Road Commission
v. Danielson, 122 Utah 220, 247 P. 2d 900 (1952); Salt
Lake & U. R. Co. v. Schramm, 56 Utah 53, 189 Pac. 90
(1920); Oregon Shortline R. Co. v. Jones, 29 Utah 147,
80 Pac. 732 ( 1905). While the Court has more often than
not defined what was not rather than what was a "taking",
the precedent nevertheless established is a death blow to
Appellants' appeal. The most recent decision rejecting Ap·
pellants' argument is State of Utah v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, '
265 P. 2d 630 (1953), a suit involving the condemnation '
of unimproved land. Therein, it was contended that by the
filing of the complaint in condemnation, development of
the property was foreclosed, that the tract was effectively
seized by the condemnor, and that accordingly, a construe·
tive "taking" of the land had occurred requiring the pay·

11

ment of interest on the judgment awarded from the date
of service of summons. The State did not assume possession of the premises, pendente lite. It was the holding of
the Court that interest, prior to the date of judgment, was
not due, since there was no "taking" until actual possession
by the condemnor. It was said:

"* * * Appellants contend, (1) that the
court improperly refused to allow interest on their
judgment from the date of service of summons in
the action, * * *
"* * * Appellants are not entitled to interest on the judgment prior to the time when actual
possession was taken. This court has uniformly so
held. * * *"

The Court noted the argument of the landowners (advanced in this case) that failure to allow interest on the
judgment from the time of service of summons, constituted
a "taking" counter to constitutional guarantees:

"* * * Appellants further argue that failure to allow such interest constitutes a taking of
private property for a public use without just compensation in violation of Article I, Sections 7 and
22 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth and
Fifth Amendments of the Federal Constitution.
* * *"
The argument was rejected and the principle affirmed
that interest in .condemnation is payable only from the date
of possession of the premises:
"Appellants have cited no case and we have
found none which holds that where under the state
law the taking occurs when the possession of the
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pr?perty is actually surrendered, and not when the
smt was commenced, that the failure to allow inter.
e~t from t_he time of the commencement of the ac.
hon _c~nshtutes a violation of these constitutional
prov1s10ns, but a number of courts, including the
Supreme Court of the United States, have held fo
the contrary. So we will adhere to our previou,
rule that interest is recoverable only from the tim,
of taking possession of the property. * * *" ·
While the Peek decision is the more contemporary of
the cases holding to the rule, the primogenitor is Oregon
Shortline R. Co. v. Jones, 29 Utah 147, 80 Pac. 732 (1905)
Substantively, the claim made there is that voiced by the
Appellants here:

"* * * Under Section 3599, appellants urge
that the right to compensation accrues and is due
on the date of the service of summons, and because
thereof, and because no improvements put upon the ,
property subsequent to that date shall be included
in the assessment of compensation of damages,
there is, when the summons is served, such an in·
terference with the full enjoyment and ordinary
benefits of the property by the owner, and such an
invasion of his rights thereto, as to amount in legal
effect, to a taking, within the meaning of the Con·
stitution, providing that 'private property shall not
be taken or damages for public use without just
compensation.' And it is claimed, as the property
was taken on that date and as compensation there·
for then became due, a~pellants were entitled to in·
terest thereon from the date of the service of sum·
mons to verdict, less rents and other benefits of
possession received by them covering the same per·
iod. * * *"
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As in the case at hand, the issue in Jones was not whether
there was ::i, "taking"; it was rather, at what point did the
"taking" o·~cul'. After discourse on the decisions of other
jurisdictions, this Court stated that under the laws of Utah,
a "taking" is not present unless there be entry or occupation by the condemning body:
"* * * Considering again our statute, it is
quite clear it excludes any claim to interest, at least
such as is here made. It says in plain terms that the
'actual value at that date (service of summons)
shall be the measure of compensation for all property to be actually taken,' etc.; that is, the Legislature has said the actual value of the land-no more,
no less-shall be the compensation to be assessed.

* * *

"When the statute says the actual value of the
land to be actually taken shall be the measure of
compensation, and that plaintiff shall have final
order of condemnation upon the payment of the sum
of money assessed, it has excluded all other conditions. San Fran&. S. J. V. Ry. Co. v. Leviston, 134
Cal. 412, 66 Pac. 473. To allow appellants' claim
of interest to prevail, we are obliged to read something into the statute not found there. Nor does it
come within any of the rules of the cases where interest has been allowed. Here there has been no
entry or occupation of the property. Nor was there
any time prior to the verdict of the jury when the
amount of plaintiff's liability had been determined.
Nor was there any time when it could have taken
possession and given a writ of assistance therefor
until final judgment and order of condemnation.
And the authorities seem to be that one or more of
these things must be shown to entitle the landowner
to interest. * * *"
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If it be the law of the case that a "taking" is not pres.
ent by the filing of a complaint or service of process, it is
magic to say that the request made by the Respondent tu
the County Planning Commission herein was a "taking''.
The facts in Peek and Jones are much the more conclusive
and drastic upon the land and its owners than the facts
which Appellants bring to this appeal. If the Road Com.
mission in January of 1961, had filed its complaint in con.
demnation and served process, that act would have pro.
duced far more serious consequences than the request actually made. Yet, under the authorities cited, a "taking''
actual or constructive, would not have transpired. Unless
this Court is willing to overturn the precedent of Peek anc:
Jones, those decisions are dispositive of Appellants' appeal.

We would add that there are varied instances when
a public agency would be deemed to have "taken" private
property even though there be no intentional or conscious
occupation. The constant flooding of private land, the depositing of materials and the severing of water supply, are
examplars of activity which might qualify as a construe·
tive "taking", even though proceedings in Eminent Domain
are not pending or contemplated. But there must be some
ouster of physical possession in addition to impairment in
the use and enjoyment of the land in order that a "taking"
exist. Nichols, in his work on Eminent Domain, Volume
2, Page 372, Sec. 6.1 ( 1) inventories the conditions which
are necessary to a constructive "taking":

"* * * Each case must be decided on its
own merits until, by the gradual process of judicial
exclusion and inclusion, it is possible to say on

1

1
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which side of the line any given injury to private
property rights may be said to fall. In a general
way, however, it may be said that when an interference with the use and enjoyment of land that
would be actionable at common law is effected under legal authority and as an incident of the construction of a public improvement, and consists of
actual entry upon land and its devotion to public
use for more than a momentary period, or of an
injury of such a character as substantially to oust
the owner from the possession of the land and to
deprive him of all beneficial use thereof, there is
a taking of property in the constitutional sense,
whether there has been any formal condemnation or
not."
Those conditions are not here present.
(b) Authorities cited by Appellants are not rele-

vant.
A preponderance of the cases which Appellants urge
as supportive of their cause involve interruption and ouster
of physical possession of the land. Thus, a flooding of the
owners fruit grove (£. L. Richards v. United States, 282
F. 2d 901 (Ct. of Cl. 1960)) and the firing of cannon over
private property (Portsmouth Harbor Land and Hotel
Company v. United States, 260 U. S. 327, 43 S. Ct. 135,
67 L. Ed. 287 ( 1922)) fit within the inventory of conditions as prescribed by Nichols, supra. They are not applicable to this case.
Several decisions which Appellants cite concern the
constitutionality of statutes where it was found that the
intent of the legislation was to permanently freeze all de-
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velopment of property. Each of those suits deal with a
direct attack upon the statute or ordinance. There are at
least three reasons why those decisions are not germa
ne.
First, Appellants have never attacked the validity of the
County Ordinance, 9-7-3, other than collaterally in this suit.
Secondly, each of the cases entailed a permanent dedication
of land. Thirdly, it was determined in several cases (Apps.'
Brief 24-25) that the zoning agencies had not acted in good
faith. The good faith of the Respondent in this suit, is not
only undenied, but admitted by all.
The rule to which Appellants fasten their hope is set
out on page 19 of their Brief. Therein it is said, "Any Jim.
itation on the free use and enjoyment of property constitutes
a taking of property." Of course, under that framework,
zoning regulations, better yet, all police power activity
would be tabbed as a constructive "taking". Fortunately,
the Ia w does not foresee such a result.
( c) Appellants' contention is a non-sequitur.

But there are even larger reasons why Appellants' ap·
peal is to fail. They urge that a "taking" transpired in
January of 1961. A "taking" of what? Not of the 12
acres ultimately condemned in July, 1963. If a taking occurred at all in 1961, it was of the entire 35 acres, for Ap·
pellants' claim is that the development of the entire prop·
erty was frustrated and delayed. By claiming a "taking"
of the entire ground on the one hand, and the right to com·
pensation only as to a part thereof on the other, a paradox
is created.
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If as contended, the request made by the Respondent

of the Planning Commission in 1961 constituted a "taking",
then Appellants are entitled to the market value of the
property at that time. But Appellants confirm the trial
Court in determining that market value is to be adjudged
as of July, 1963, two and one-half years subsequent to the
time in which they claim their land was "taken." It is fair
to say that the 1963 date reflects higher and appreciated
land values. The argument is a non-sequitur.
POINT III.
ANSWERING APP E LL ANT S ' POINT II,
LANDOWNERS HA VE ALREADY RECOVERED THE FULL MEASURE OF COMPENSATION UNDER THE LAW.
Appellants, while confessing the weakness of Point I
of their Brief, allege under Point II special damages beyond that awarded in the main eminent domain trial. Encompassed within this claim are the loss of investment and
interest money ($29,312.95), real taxes assessed for the
years 1961 through 1964 ($1,189.20), salaries, insurance
premiums, water service, and other costs. Only gasoline
and travel expenses to and from the property appear to be
eliminated.
Compensation to which Appellants are due is governed
by the eminent domain Statute, 78-34-10 U. C. A., 1953.
That law is implementive of the Constitutional mandate,
Article 1, Section 22, requiring the payment of just compensation for the taking of private property. Logan City

18

Board of Education v. Croft, 13 U. 2d 310, 373 P. 2d 6g)
(1962); Sidney Stevens Implement Co. v. Ogden City, 8B
Utah 578, 33 P. 2d 181 (1934). It obligates the trial couit
to find:
The fair market value of the land and improvements taken (Section (1));
Damages to remaining property caused by the
severance of the portion acquired and the
construction of the public improvement !Section (2));
Damage to land, no part of which is taken, consequentially caused by the taking of other
property (Section ( 3) ) .
At the trial in this matter, the jury and Court found the
facts to be:
1)

Market value of total tract (35 acres)
before taking .......................................... $274,645.011

2)

Market value of remaining tract (23
acres) after taking ................................ 144,645.00

Total Award (Just Compensation) ........... $130,000.00
The special verdict and judgment were considerate of
Section ( 1) and Section (2) damage under 78-34-10. Section (3) consequential damage, as defined by this Court,
was not raised by the evidence of Appellants or embodied
within the judgment. Logan City Board of Education v.
Croft, 13 U. 2d 310, 373 P. 2d 697 (1962); Southern Pacific
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Co. v. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306, 352 P. 2d 693 (1960).
Thus, the Appellants purchased the 35 acres in 1959 for
$170,000.00. The judgment in condemnation was entered
in the sum of $130,000.00 for the acquisition of 12 of those
acres by Respondent in 1963.
The damages to which Appellants lay claim have no
relation to the land value under investigation, either before
or after the control date. They have their clearest form in
contemplated loss of contract bargain, loss of profits, frustration of future plans and damage in personam to the
Appellants, all of which this Court has once pronounced to
be non-compensable as a matter of law. State Road Commission v. Hansen, et ux., 14 U. 2d 305, 383 P. 2d
917 (1963); State of Utah v. Bird & Evans, Inc., and
Tr:drsco, 4 U. 2d 31, 286 P. 2d 785 (1955); State of Utah
v. Tedesco, 4 U. 2d 248, 291 P. 2d 1028 (1956). See also
Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 2, p. 185, s~. 5.76 (2),
and West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. United States, 200
F. 2d 100 ( 4 C. A. 1952). Those damages which inure to
and partake of the property itself, were fully adjudicated
at the main trial by jury. To recognize Appellants' claims
as valid would be to recognize double recovery.
(a) Appellants' claims constitute separate causes

of action against the sovereign, and, in all
events, may not be recovered in thi,s proceeding.
Appellants assume for this Point that the request of
Respondent to the Planning Commission in 1961 was not
a "taking" of their property. That being the case, their
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claim for resulting injury must qualify within one of th"
conventional forms of action, ex delicto or ex contrachi.
Do the claims sound in tort, negligence or intentional, 01
contract, express or implied? One is hard pressed in r~
sponding that the action is in contract, for the rudiments
of an agreement, express or implied, are quite absent. .\
closer course is to hold that the claims are ex delicto, either
negligent or intentional. In either event, they have their
genesis not in or as a result of the condemnation suit initiated in I963, but in the prior and unrelated ads of the
Respondent in I961. In that capacity, the claims are
against the sovereign and are independent of this proceed·
ing. The law is too well settled in this jurisdiction for
more than academic debate that the sovereign is immune
from suit at law for tortious damage. Fairclough, et al. v.
State Road Commission, et al., IOU. 2d 4I7, 354 P. 2d lQj
(I960); Springville Banking Co. v. C. Taylor Burton and
State Road Commission, IO U. 2d 100, 349 P. 2d 10i
(1960); State of Utah v. Bird & Evans, Inc., and Tedesco
4 U. 2d 3I, 286 P. 2d 785 (I955); Campbell Bldg. Co. v.
State Road Commission, 95 Utah 242, 70 P. 2d 857 (1927)
We are quick to add that sovereign immunity is neither
waived by the action in condemnation which Respondent
filed in I963, State Road Commission v. Parker, 13 U. 2d
65, 368 P. 2d 585 (I962); Commissioner v. Berke County,
364 Pa. 447, 72 A. 2d I29; Moore on Federal Practice, Vol.
3, page 43, Section 13.I5 (2), nor is the State of Utah, br
such filing, thereby subjected to all grievances which the
landowners may harbor. School District No. 2 v. United
States, 229 F. 2d 68I (6 C. A. I956). In State Road Coin·
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mission v. Parker, supra, it was held that a counter-claim
in tort stands on no better footing against the State than
an original complaint at law. In both instances, the remedy, if any, was said to rest with the State Board of Examiners. The trial Court, in the suit at bar, viewed the
claims of Appellant in a parallel light. (Conclusions of Law
No. 3, 4 and 5, R. 74A, 75).
POINT IV.
ANSWERING APPELLANTS' POINT III, ENGINEERING AND PLANNING COSTS FOR A
PROPOSED SUBDIVISION ARE NOT RECOVERABLE IN EMINENT DOMAIN.
(a)

Such costs do not constitute an improvement
to the realty under 78-34-10 (1), U. C. A.,
1953.

Point III of Appellants' Brief is unimpressive. It is
therein said that expenses incurred in devising plans for
the proposed subdivision of the condemned acreage are
recoverable as an "improvement appertaining to the realty"
under Section ( 1) of 78-23-10. There is no preeedent in
the law for such a statement.
The Statute is plain in its meaning that an "improvement" requires that some physical and permanent change
be evidenced. To classify as an improvement, the asset
must be so attached to the realty that, under Property Law,
it would pass to a grantee as an appurtenance. Such is
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implied from the phrase in the statute "and all improve.
ments thereon appertaining to the realty."
Subdivision plans and schemes for property develop.
ment are not admissible, much less comparable in eminent
domain. In Redondo Beach School District of Los Angeles
County v. Flodine, 314 P. 2d 581 (Cal. 1957), the rule was
said to be:
"Coming to appellant's last contention, appar·
ently appellant attempted to subdivide the property
in some way or other and ultimately to subdivide
all of it, but the usual rule in eminent domain proceedings is that a proposed plan for the development of the property proposed to be taken is not
material on the issue of market value."

Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 4, p. 152, Sec. 12.314
is of the same opinion:
"Evidence may be adduced showing only the
naturally adapted uses of the property in its present condition. The owner's actual plans or hopes
for the future are completely irrelevant. Such matters are regarded as too remote and speculative to
merit consideration."
The contention of Appellants should be rejected.
CONCLUSION
The claim for relief of Appellants is not borne out by
d'd1
the facts. The acts of Respondent in December of 1960
not produce a "taking" of Appellants' property. The de·
mands for special damages are not well taken, the damage
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being non-compensable. Aceordingly, the Order of Involuntary Dismissal entered by the lower court should be, by
this Court, affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN,
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Special Assistant
Attorney General,

Attorneys for Respondent.

